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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Oil" S'l \ i l HI HI Ml

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

v.
RODOLFO SOTOLONGO

:

\ppeilant

:

Case No. 20020528-CA

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for aggravated assaul
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated section "'*-; ! 0?(3j (1999). 1 lu^
Coin i dins iiiiisiiiiii/tiiiiii i \vi ihe appeal under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(Supp. 2002), which grants this Court *

legree

or capital felony.

>? I A 1 KMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
In sentencing co-defendants to a crime, sentencing judges inusl . nitwit i \\w
sentence given the other co-defendants and must provide reasons for sentencing one colefniHlaiil li> a luwici sentence than the others. Here, the sentencing judge gave no
explanation for senten

.

. term than m - , , defendant even

though the co-defendant was convicted of a more scno;

least culpable of the two. Did the sentencing judge abuse his discretion in imposing a
more severe sentence?
This Court reviews sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Montova. 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Appellant argued at sentencing that
it would be fundamentally unfair to impose a longer sentence than the sentence his more
culpable co-defendant received. R. 69: 3-4, 9.1

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-201(2) (Supp. 2002) provides sentencing
judges several options in imposing sentences:
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may
sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the
following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
Utah Code Annotated section 77-18-l(2)(a) (1999) grants sentencing judges
discretion whether to impose probation:

Volume 69 contains the sentencing hearing transcript. Volume 71 contains the
presentence investigation report including the various diagnostic evaluations APP
peifonned at the prison. The internal page numbers of those volumes will be relened to
"R." followed by the volume number, the internal page numbers of those volumes, and,
where applicable, the description of the referenced report.
2

OB. a plea of guilty, guilty and mentalh • L
contest, or
conviction of any crime or offense, the cou\ ma> suspend the
imposition 01 execution of sentence and place the defendant on
probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private
organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under tl
t.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
()n lime I II, ,'IHM (lit1 Mule tiled an Information charging Appellant Rodolfo
Sotolongo with attempted i in in I i JHJ u^LMiivaU'd .r.siiull K ," }

I hr State

subsequently amended the Information and charged Mr. Sotolongo in the .*ih=
attempted murder or aggravated assault and then added the charge of aggravated
buj-gjajx

magistrate bound the case over for trial following a preliminary

hearing
On December 18, 2001, Mr. Sotolongo entered a plea agreement in whit li lie
:

agreed to plead guilty to third degree aggravated nsstm!

\*

.(gu'i;<l (in il^.nii1-1 ''lie more serious charges. < Hi Maiu

\ 2002. the trial court accepted

Ur

!n exchange, the State

:**lt\ Dlca

V

the Department of Adult Probation and Parole ("APP") to psychologically evaluar

n.

R. 50.
nducted a sentencing hearing oii June 24. 2002 R 69 Defense
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counsel argued it would not be fair to sentence Mr. Sotolongo to a prison term because
his co-defendant had pleaded guilty to a second degree felony, was clearly the more
culpable of the two, and had received a jail sentence and probation. R. 69: 3-4, 9. The
sentencing judge rejected counsel's arguments and sentenced Mr. Sotolongo for up to
five years in prison. R. 69: 9-10. Mr. Sotolongo filed a timely notice of appeal on July
11,2002. R. 57.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 6, 2001, Mr. Sotolongo and Osmani Fuentes went to Rosa Gamarro's
home to retrieve some of Mr. Fuentes' personal belongings. R. 71: 2. Mr. Fuentes had
lived with Ms. Gamarro and they had a two-year-old child together. R. 71: 2. After their
relationship ended the previous month, Ms. Gamarro barred Mr. Fuentes from entering
the house. R. 71: 4.
Ms. Gamarro's 18-year-old daughter from a previous relationship, Andrea
Gamarro, was home when the two men arrived. R. 71: 2. Andrea gave conflicting
reports about whether she let the men enter or whether they forced themselves into the
home. R. 71: 2. Mr. Fuentes was enraged over the end of his relationship with Ms.
Gamarro. R. 71: 2. He was also angry with Andrea because she had called the police a
few weeks previously about Mr. Fuentes. R. 71: 2. Mr. Fuentes also resented that
Andrea had renewed her relationship with her birth father and had invited him to her
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high school graduation. R. 71: 2-4.
Andrea alleged that Mr. Sotolongo and Mr. Fuentes were both wearing surgical
gloves when they entered. R /I,,,11 Mr Fuentes began rummaging through the house
searchingAnv hi< [KT<oii;:ii Ivlongiiigs wliil 1 Mi '"-otolongo assisted him. H i\ 2.
Andrea again gave conflicting reports on whether the men left tin 11»1111r . 11111 r I m 11 1 i
stayed there. R 7 1 ? Tu anv event, she stated that Mr. Fuentes grabbed her, pushed her
(

ued, and threatened

Fuentr

. •-"• o -n . -» A .. .i_

:} f0Ug}1^

bac]< a n ( i struck Mr.

^Mr. Fuentes asked Mr. Sotolongo for a belt which (^ 11 'M 11n11111 11 n1111 i n 1 11 1

handed to Mr. Fuentes, R, 71 2 Mr. Fuentes then ordered Mr. Sotolongo to hold
Andrea's legs. I!

I ,.! As Mi Sotolongo held down Andrea, Mi Fuentes wrapped the

belt

-.»at vou get for

calling the police on me.1' k. ,i.^.

ivn. Fuentes then sti'im^lnl Aiwliui until Jn. losi

consciousness. R 71- 2
When Andrea regained consciousness, she was on the floor and she heard Mr.
Fuentes

*•

tenius ioucd .Andrea onto the

bed and resumed choking her with the belt until she lost c oi lscioi isness agaii i R 71: 2.
She again awoke and heard Mr. Sotolongo warning Mr. Fuentes that he had better stop.

\( soon1 poml Ninlii i h\'U'liri1 Un Ilk tdepliuiu .md Mi Fuentes grabbed it away
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from her. R. 71: 3. Andrea and Mr. Fuentes continued to exchange bites, kicks, and
punches. R. 71: 3. Mr. Fuentes ordered Andrea not to call anyone and threatened to
harm her and her boyfriend if she did. R. 71: 3. Andrea's mother, Ms. Gamarro, then
called on the telephone. R. 71: 3. Andrea apparently picked up the phone as both men
warned Andrea not to say anything to her mother. R. 71: 3.2
Mr. Fuentes went into the kitchen, grabbed a knife, acted as if he were going to
stab Andrea, and threatened to kill her if she called the police. R. 71: 3. He warned her
further that he could have a friend or family member kill her, her mother, and her father
even if the police arrested him. R. 71: 3. As the men left, Mr. Sotolongo also warned
Andrea not to call the police on him because he had only held her legs and he would kill
her if she told anyone. R. 71: 3.
Andrea called her mother back who in turn notified the police. R. 71: 3. Medical
personnel transported Andrea to the hospital where she was treated for injuries to her
face, chest, neck, and abdomen. R. 21. The most serious injury involved swelling that
commonly occurs in strangulation victims. R. 22-23; R. 71: 15. The treating physician
noted that Andrea was "exceedingly lucky that she was not killed in this episode." R. 22.
Nevertheless, the hospital discharged Andrea the same day. R. 23.

2

The presentence report states that Mr. Sotolongo also threatened to kill her if she
told her mother. R. 71: 3. However, the next sentence states that "He [referring to the
person who made the threat] then left and defendant [Mr. Sotolongo] stayed." R. 71: 3.
The account is, therefore, vague on who made this threat. At any rate, it is undisputed
that Andrea claims that Mr. Sotolongo later threatened to kill her before he left. R. 71: 3.
6

The police arrested Mr. Sotolongo at his workplace shortly after the incident. R.
71:3. Mr. Sotolongo waived his right to counsel and the right to silence and informed
the police that Mr. Fuentes approached him earlier in the day about retrieving his
personal belongings for himfromthe Gamarro residence because Mr. Fuentes had been
barred from entering the house. R. 71: 3. When the two men arrived at the house,
Andrea was talking on the telephone with Ms. Gamarro. R. 71: 3. The men began
retrieving various items and then Mr. Fuentes hung up the phone. R. 71: 3.
While the two men were in separate rooms, Mr. Sotolongo heard Andrea scream.
R. 71: 3. Mr. Sotolongo went into the other room and saw Mr. Fuentes on top of
Andrea. R. 71: 3. Mr. Fuentes ordered Mr. Sotolongo to either grab a belt and to hold
Andrea's legs or he would kill him. R. 71: 3. After Mr. Sotolongo complied, Mr.
Feuntes strangled Andrea's neck with the belt and tried to suffocate her with a pillow. R.
71:3. When Andrea lost consciousness, Mr. Fuentes pushed her off the bed and
informed Mr. Sotolongo that he wanted to kill Andrea because she had called the police
on him. R. 71: 3-4. Apparently after Andrea awoke, Mr. Fuentes threatened to kill her if
she told the police. R. 71: 4. Mr. Sotolongo claimed that he was afraid of Mr. Fuentes
and feared retaliation against him or his family if Mr. Fuentes knew he was talking to the
police. R. 71:4.
The State charged Mr. Sotolongo with attempted murder and aggravated assault.
R. 2-3. The State later amended the charging document to accuse Mr. Sotolongo of
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committing either attempted murder or aggravated assault plus aggravated burglary. R.
25-26. At a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound over Mr. Sotolongo for trial. R.
28-29.
Prior to trial, Mr. Sotolongo agreed to plead guilty to third degree aggravated
assault in exchange for the dismissal of the outstanding charges. R. 37. The trial court
accepted the guilty plea and ordered APP to prepare a presentence report. R. 43. The
trial court further committed Mr. Sotolongo to the Utah State Prison for 60 days to allow
APP to conduct a diagnostic evaluation of him. R. 50.
The presentence investigation revealed that Mr. Sotolongo was born and raised in
Cuba by both of his parents. R. 71: 10. He described his childhood as normal and stated
that he lived in a good, middle-income home. R. 71: 10-11. At the age of 17, he
emigrated to the United States and settled in Utah. R. 71: 10-11.
When the attack on Andrea occurred, Mr. Sotolongo was 21 years old. R. 71: 1.
He was married to Zoila Velasquez. R. 71: 11. Zoila had a three-year-old child from
another relationship while Zoila and Mr. Sotolongo had a two-year old-child together. R.
71: 11.
Mr. Sotolongo stated that he was introverted and had few friends outside his
family. R. 71: 11. He reported no problems with substance abuse and he had no history
of mental or emotional problems. R. 71: 13. Because of Mr. Sotolongo's limited
English skills, the APP investigator indicated that Mr. Sotolongo may have had trouble
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understanding some questions. R. 71: 13.
Mr. Sotolongo described himself as a hard-working, good man. R. 71: 12-13.
Since coming to the United States, he maintained steady employment at various jobs
including the food service industry and auto repair. R. 71: 12.
Mr. Sotolongo had previously incurred several traffic violations that resulted in
fines and one suspended sentence. R. 71: 9. Also, between his arrest in this case and the
completion of the presentence report, Mr. Sotolongo had been arrested twice for
domestic violence involving his wife. R. 71: 9-10. APP administered a Level of Service
Inventory ("LSI") to gauge Mr. Sotolongo's likelihood of re-offending which resulted in
a low score requiring "a low level of intervention." R. 71: 14.
When asked to give his version of the offense, Mr. Sotolongo stated that his
cousin, Mr. Fuentes, picked him upfromwork and asked for help to retrieve his personal
belongings at the Gamarros'. R. 71: 4. Upon arrival, Mr. Fuentes informed Mr.
Sotolongo for the first time that he was not allowed to enter the house. R. 71: 4. Mr.
Sotolongo offered to retrieve the belongings while Mr. Fuentes waited in the car. R. 71:
4.
After returning some videos to the car, Mr. Sotolongo noticed that Mr. Fuentes
was not in the car. R. 71: 4. He returned to the house and saw Mr. Fuentes sitting on the
couch. R. 71: 4. Andrea asked Mr. Fuentes to leave and Mr. Sotolongo echoed her
request and suggested that they leave the house. R. 71: 5.

9

When Mr. Sotolongo went into a bedroom to fetch some clothes, he heard Andrea
screaming in the other bedroom. R. 71: 5. As he entered the bedroom, he saw Mr.
Fuentes on top of Andrea choking her. R. 71: 5. Mr. Sotolongo claimed that he then
grabbed Andrea's feet and pulled her off of the bed in an effort to help her. R. 71: 4-5.
Mr. Fuentes pushed Mr. Sotolongo against the wall and stated that he wanted to kill
Andrea. R. 71: 5. Mr. Sotolongo then pushed Mr. Fuentes against the wall and herded
him out the door. R. 71: 5.
Mr. Sotolongo returned to the bedroom and asked Andrea three times if she was
okay. R. 71: 5. Andrea stated that she was alright and asked Mr. Sotolongo to remove
Mr. Fuentes which he did. R. 71: 5. Mr. Sotolongo denied threatening Andrea and
being afraid of Mr. Fuentes. R. 71: 5. He stated that he "had nothing!!! to do" with the
attack. R. 71: 4 (emphasis in original).
Andrea reported to the APP investigator that the attack had caused her great fear
and anxiety to the point where she cannot be alone. R. 71: 5-6. She was left with a scar
on her face which had caused her to lose all self-worth. R. 71: 6. The attack resulted in
depression for which she was taking medication. R. 71: 6. Although Andrea had
attended therapy, she stated that it had not helped. R. 71: 6. Because of her fears of
another attack, she was unable to work. R. 71: 6. Her inter-personal relationships had
also suffered, as had her family ties. R. 71: 6. Because of the attack, she and her mother
were forced to move into a friend's garage that had no heating or cooling. R. 71: 6.
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The APP investigator concluded that Mr. Sotolongo was "open and honest. . .
about himself." R. 71: 13. The investigator noted, however, that Mr. Sotolongo's claims
that he tried to save Andrea were inconsistent with his statements to the police that Mr.
Fuentes forced him to help in the attack and that he feared Mr. Fuentes. R. 71: 15.
Given these inconsistencies and Mr. Sotolongo's failure to notify the police, the
investigator concluded that Mr. Sotolongo was not an innocent bystander and had failed
to accept responsibility for his actions. R. 71: 15. The investigator did note that the fact
that Mr. Sotolongo was the "lesser participant" in this matter mitigated the severity of the
crime. R. 71: 15. Noting his concern for Mr. Sotolongo's two subsequent arrests for
domestic violence and the extent of Andrea's injuries, the investigator recommended
sentencing Mr. Sotolongo to prison. R. 71: 15-16.
During the diagnostic evaluation, Mr. Sotolongo disclosed that his family was not
as functional as he indicated to the APP investigator. Specifically, his father abused his
mother and his father was imprisoned for 15 years in Cuba for theft.

R. 71:

Psychological Evaluation: 1. At the age of six, Mr. Sotolongo was removed from his
parents' home for some undisclosed reason and he lived with an uncle who eventually
emigrated to the United States.

R. 71: Psychological Evaluation: 1.

Mr. Sotolongo dropped out of school in the ninth grade. R. 71: Psychological
Evaluation at 4. He scored 72 on an IQ test. R. 71: Psychological Evaluation: 4. The
administrator of this examination doubted the accuracy of the score given Mr.
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Sotolongo's limited English skills. R. 71: Psychological Evaluation: 4.
Mr. Sotolongo gave conflicting reports about whether he had threatened Andrea
and whether Mr. Fuentes threatened to harm him if he did not assist in the attack. R. 71:
Psychological Evaluation: 3; Diagnostic Evaluation: 2-3; Diagnostic Group Report: 2.
Several of the evaluators concluded that Mr. Sotolongo had not accepted responsibly for
his actions and suffered from thinking errors. R. 71: Diagnostic Evaluation: 3;
Diagnostic Group Report: 2. They reasoned that he minimized the extent of Andrea's
injuries, he needed power and control, and he regarded himself as the victim of Mr.
Fuentes' actions. R. 71: Diagnostic Evaluation: 3; Diagnostic Group Report: 1-2. He
also blamed his wife for overreacting and calling the police on the two domestic violence
incidents subsequent to his arrest R. 71: Diagnostic Group Report: 2. For these reasons,
and the fact that two outside treatment facilities had rejected Mr. Sotolongo, the
evaluators recommended that Mr. Sotolongo be sent to prison and that he receive
intensive treatment for domestic violence and anger management. R. 71: Psychological
Evaluation: 6; Diagnostic Evaluation: 4-5; Diagnostic Group Report: 3.
At sentencing, defense counsel argued that the diagnostic evaluators had
misjudged Mr. Sotolongo based on his limited ability to understand questions in English.
R. 69: 2-4. Rather than viewing Mr. Sotolongo's statements as denying responsibility,
defense counsel asked the sentencing judge to find "a middle ground." R. 69: 2. For
example, regardless of the true facts, it was undisputed that Mr. Sotolongo was the least

12

culpable offender and he undeniably stopped Mr. Fuentes from killing Andrea. R. 69: 23. He also noted that APP considered Mr. Sotolongo a low risk. R. 69: 5.
Defense counsel argued further that sending Mr. Sotolongo to prison would be a
"miscarriage of justice" and "fundamentally unfair" given Mr. Fuentes' sentence. R. 69:
3-4, 9. Mr. Fuentes pleaded guilty to a second degree aggravated assault as opposed to
Mr. Sotolongo's plea to a third degree felony R. 69: 3. Nevertheless, the sentencing
judge in Mr. Fuentes9 case suspended a one-to-fifteen year sentence, ordered him to
serve 365 days in jail with credit for time served, and ordered him to devote 100 hours of
community service. R. 69: 3.
The prosecutor requested a prison term instead of probation. R. 69: 9. He
asserted that regardless of Mr. Fuentes' sentence, Mr. Sotolongo should go to prison. R.
69: 6-9. Mr. Sotolongo requested a second chance from the sentencing judge and asked
for probation to allow him to provide for his wife and their two children. R. 69: 5, 9.
The sentencing judge summarily concluded that Mr. Fuentes' sentence was
irrelevant and that a prison term of up to five years was proper: "I don't know why the
co-defendant received the sentence that he did but Mr. Sotolongo, it seems to me that a
fair sentence for what you did would be the indeterminate term of zero to five years in
the state prison." R. 69: 9. The judge then ordered Mr. Sotolongo to pay full restitution
to Andrea and ended the hearing. R. 69: 10. This appeal followed. R. 57.

13

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Although sentencing judges have wide discretion in sentencing, that discretion is
not unlimited. Sentences cannot be excessive or inherently unfair. Also, when one codefendant receives a lengthier sentence than another co-defendant to the same crime,
sentencing judges must explain on the record the reasons for the disparate sentences. In
this case, Mr. Sotolongo's prison sentence was grossly unfair given that Mr. Fuentes
received a jail sentence and probation even though he pleaded to a more serious crime
and was the most culpable of the two. The sentencing judge's failure to consider Mr.
Fuentes' sentence in punishing Mr. Sotolongo requires a remand for a new sentencing
hearing.

ARGUMENT
THE SENTENCING JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CO-DEFENDANT'S
SUSPENDED SENTENCE AND THEN SENDING
APPELLANT TO PRISON EVEN THOUGH HE WAS
UNDENIABLY THE LEAST CULPABLE OFFENDER
Before sentencing a co-defendant, sentencing judges must consider the codefendants' culpability and the sentences the other co-defendants receive. The
sentencing judge's failure to compare Mr. Fuentes' sentence and culpability with Mr.
Sotolongo's culpability was an abuse of discretion. Mr. Sotolongo's prison sentence was
inherently unfair given Mr. Fuentes' suspended sentence and the undisputed fact that Mr.
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Sotolongo was less culpable. As such, this Court should remand this matter to the trial
court for a new sentencing hearing.
The imposition of a prison term under these circumstances was an abuse of
discretion. Admittedly, sentencing judges have wide discretion in deciding whether to
order probation in lieu of a prison term. State v. Chapoose. 985 P.2d 915, 917 (Utah
1999). Judges may "impose sentence or a combination of sentences which may include
the payment of a fine, restitution, probation, or imprisonment." State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d
417, 420 (Utah 1987); see also; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (Supp. 2002). But, an
appellate court must set aside a sentence "when it is inherently unfair or clearly
excessive." State v. Woodland. 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997).
Sentencing Mr. Sotolongo to prison, given his lesser involvement in the crime and
in light of Mr. Fuentes' sentence, was "inherently unfair." IdL Although Mr. Sotolongo
gave Mr. Fuentes the belt used to choke Andrea, held down her legs, and threatened to
harm her, he also persuaded Mr. Fuentes to suspend the attack and not to kill Andrea.
Andrea conceded that Mr. Sotolongo told Mr. Fuentes he had better stop or, presumably,
he would kill Andrea. Thus, Mr. Sotolongo likely saved Andrea's life.
In comparison, Mr. Fuentes repeatedly hit Andrea in the head, face, chest, and
abdomen. He then strangled her until she passed out. When she regained consciousness,
he strangled her again and smothered her face in an apparent attempt to kill her. He
appeared to be determined to follow through with these attempts until Mr. Sotolongo
15

served as a voice of reason and warned him to stop. Mr. Fuentes' brutal actions far
outweigh Mr. Sotolongo's assistance and intervention in stopping the attack.
Fairness demands that judges "consider the sentence given the codefendant and, if
a longer sentence is given, the reasons for doing so should be set forth on the record."
State v. Bailev. 834 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Kan. 1992). Disparity among co-defendants'
sentences requires judges to ffconsider[] the individual characteristics of the defendant
being sentenced, the harm caused by that defendant, and the prior criminal conduct of that
defendant." State v. Smith, 864 P.2d 709, 717 (Kan. 1993) (quoting State v. Stallings.
792 P.2d 1013, 1014 (Kan. 1990)). The failure to consider these factors is an abuse of
discretion. IdL; see also United States v. Simpson. 8 F.3d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1993) ("if a
judge sentences similar offenders to greatly disparate terms for the same crime, without
any explanation, an inference arises that he failed to exercise his discretion.") (quoting
United States v. Ely. 719 F.2d 902, 906-07 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis omitted)).
Here, the sentencing judge simply ruled that regardless of Mr. Fuentes' sentence, a
prison term seemed "fair" to him. R. 69: 9. The judge did not consider Mr. Fuentes'
sentence, Mr. Sotolongo's comparative culpability, the fact that Mr. Sotolongo's prior
convictions consisted of minor traffic offenses, or his low risk level for re-offending. The
sentencing judge abused his discretion in failing to explain his reasons on the record for
imposing a harsher sentence on Mr. Sotolongo. Bailey, 834 P.2d at 1356.
Although the diagnostic evaluators recommended a prison term, they did not
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compare Mr. Sotolongo's sentence with Mr. Fuentes'. In contrast, sentencing judges
must consider "all legally relevant factors" in sentencing. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d
1133, 1135 (Utah 1989). The sentencing judge's failure to weigh Mr. Fuentes' sentence
and the two co-defendants' respective culpability require a new sentencing hearing.
The case of State v. Goering, 594 P.2d 194 (Kan. 1979), provides a strikingly
similar example of a sentencing judge's failure to compare the defendant's culpability
with a co-defendant. In that case, the appellant and two co-defendants committed armed
robbery, kidnaping, and attempted murder. Id at 196-97. It was undisputed that
appellant was not armed herself and she only served as the get-away driver while the
other two co-defendants actually committed the crimes. Id. at 201. Without providing
any reasoning, the sentencing judge imposed consecutive sentences on the appellant while
her co-defendant received concurrent sentences. Id at 199-200. The Georing Court
remanded the case for resentencing because the appellant's sentences were "out of
proportion to the sentence imposed upon her codefendant." Id at 200; see also Bailey,
834 P.2d at 1356 (sentencing judge abused discretion in giving appellant 45-year
minimum sentence when more culpable co-defendant received only 30-year minimum
sentence).
This case presents an equally compelling case. Mr. Fuentes brutally beat and
attempted several times to murder a young woman. Absent Mr. Sotolongo's intervention,
Mr. Fuentes likely would have succeeded. Nevertheless, Mr. Fuentes received probation.
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In contrast, although Mr. Sotolongo never even struck the victim, he was sent to prison.
This inherent unfairness constitutes an abuse of discretion. Woodland. 945 P.2d at 671.
Utah courts do not appear to have specifically addressed whether sentencing
judges must compare co-defendants' sentences. But, thirty years ago, the Utah Supreme
Court issued conflicting dicta on this issue. In State v. Kish, 503 P.2d 1208, 1209 (Utah
1972), the State charged two co-defendants with committing the same crime. The
prosecutor offered a plea bargain to both co-defendants but only one of them accepted the
deal. Id When the other co-defendant proceeded to trial, was convicted, and received a
stiffer sentence than the other co-defendant, he appealed his sentence. Id The Utah
Supreme Court ruled that the appellant had not been harmed because he could have
accepted the plea bargain but chose not to. Id
In dicta, the Court added that even if the prosecutor had only offered the bargain to
one co-defendant, the other had no claim. Id In support of this assertion, the Court
quoted the Arizona Court of Appeals' statement that co-defendants cannot '"complain (1)
if the prosecutor failed to prosecute his brother, or (2) if a jury convicted him and
acquitted his brother, or (3) if identical sentences were not imposed on both. . . .'" Id.
(quoting Cuzik v. State. 421 P.2d 537, 538 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966)).
Less than one month later, the Utah Supreme Court decided State v. Garcia, 504
P.2d 1015 (Utah 1972). In that case, the prosecutor charged two equally culpable codefendants with burglary. Id The prosecutor offered one co-defendant a misdemeanor
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conviction while not extending the offer to the other. IdL The latter co-defendant
proceeded to trial and was convicted of a felony. IdL The trial judge, perceiving an
injustice, arrested the felony judgment and discharged the second co-defendant. IdL The
Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's decision and ruled that the judge had discretion to
arrest the judgment. Id. at 1016.
The dissenting justice quoted the same dicta from Arizona that Kish quoted and
argued that no injustice had occurred. Id at 1016. Rather, he claimed that prosecutors
had statutory authority to offer plea bargains to co-defendants in exchange for their
willingness to testify against the other co-defendant. Id.
These cases, especially when they were decided within a month of each other,
appear to conflict. Although Kish cited the proposition that co-defendants cannot
complain if one of them receives a harsher sentence, Garcia appeared to hold just the
opposite. These decisions are especially confusing because the dissent in Garcia
specifically reminded the Court of its earlier ruling less than one month previously.
These cases do not control this case. In the first place, the quoted language in Kish
was plainly dicta because the Court had already made its decision and the quotation was
not necessary to the court's decision. See State v. Gardiner. 814 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah
1991). Second, the Court appeared to backtrack from the quotation a few short weeks
later when it recognized in Garcia that a co-defendant had been sentenced unfairly.
Third, Kish and Garcia have no applicability to this case because the co-defendants in
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those cases were equally culpable, unlike here. Kish, 503 P.2d at 1209; Garcia. 504 P.2d
at 1015. Fourth, because the Utah Supreme Court has never relied on the quotation from
Kish since that case was decided 30 years ago, its precedential value appears to be
limited. Fifth, consistent with this conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically
limited Garcia's holding to "the proposition that the decision of which crime, if any, to
charge against a person under a given set of facts is left to the prosecutor." State v. Mohi.
901 P.2d 991, 1003, n.18 (Utah 1995). In sum, neither, Garcia, nor Kish address the
fairness of imposing disparate sentences on defendants with varying degrees of
culpability.
Common sense and basic notions of fairness dictate that sentencing judges must
compare co-defendants' sentences. Although a co-defendant's sentence does not bind
sentencing judges to sentence another co-defendant similarly, fairness and the appearance
of justice do require judges to state their reasons for imposing disparate sentences.
Bailey. 834 P.2d at 1356. As stated above, judges must consider "all legally relevant
factors." Gibbons. 779 P.2d at 1135. Fairness especially requires comparing codefendants' sentences and culpability when, as here, one co-defendant is far less culpable
than the other. Because the sentencing judge failed to factor in Mr. Fuentes' sentence and
Mr. Sotolongo's lesser culpability, this Court should remand this matter for a new
sentencing hearing.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Sotolongo requests this Court to remand this matter to the trial court for a new
sentencing hearing with instructions to compare Mr. Fuentes' sentence and culpability in
sentencing Mr. Sotolongo.
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 011908413 FS

RODOLFO SOTOLONGO,
Defendant.
Custody: Prison

Judge:
Date:

ROBIN W. REESE
June 24. 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
marlened
Prosecutor: PARKER, PAUL
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHN WEST
Interpreter: INTERPRETER PRESENT
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Language: SPANISH
Date of birth: August 2, 1979
Video
Tape Number:
TAPE
Tape Count: 11:36
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 12/18/2001 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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RESTITUTION JOINTLY AND SEVERLY THROUGH BOARD OF PARDONS
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District Court Judge.',*/'.-
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